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Abstract: This article explores the evolution of the Spanish innovative capacity 
from the 19th century to the present day compared to some countries in 
Western Europe and Latin America. To this end, three indicators have been 
used: patents granted in the USA, domestic patent applications in each country, 
and scientific publications. The first appears to be, within its limitations, the 
best measure of national innovative capacity, although the other two provide 
valuable complementary information. The study reveals that Spain has 
significantly improved its innovative capacity over time, although it still lags 
far behind the most innovative countries. On the other hand, Argentina and 
Mexico were ahead of Spain in the first half of the twentieth century, but today 
Spain has an innovative capacity several times greater than that of the two 
Latin American countries. In fact, Argentina and Mexico seem to have reversed 
their innovative capacity over time. 
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1 Introduction 
Since the seminal contribution of Schumpeter (1934), a multitude of theoretical, 
empirical and historical studies (e.g., Solow, 1957; Landes, 1969; Mokyr, 1990; Romer, 
1990; Porter, 1990, etc.) have been showing in various ways the close relationship 
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between innovation and economic development. Some even claim that the engine of 
long-term growth is technology [Grossman and Helpman, (1991), p.18]. In any case, it 
seems unquestionable that it is one of the main determinants of economic progress. In the 
Spanish case, there is evidence that its low technological level has contributed to its 
relative economic backwardness in modern times (e.g., López and Valdaliso, 1997; 
Cebrián Villar, 2001; Ortiz-Villajos, 2004, 2009; Prados-de-la-Escosura and Rosés, 2009; 
Cubel et al., 2012). Therefore, understanding how technology is created or increased is 
key to explaining differences in wealth between countries and how to reduce them. This 
requires obtaining some kind of measurement of the national technological level to 
subsequently investigate the factors that determine it. 
The process of creating and increasing technological capacity is gradual and complex, 
as is evident, for example, in the essay by Mokyr (2002) on the formation of useful 
knowledge that led to the Industrial Revolution. In the field of innovation and 
development studies there is a current that seeks to identify and quantify the determinants 
of technological or innovative capacity (e.g., Lall, 1992; James and Romijn, 1997; 
Narula, 2004). In this line, Furman et al. (2002) analyse the determining factors of what 
they call ‘national innovative capacity’ through a sample of seventeen OECD countries in 
the period 1973–1996. The study includes a wide variety of factors (human capital, R&D 
investment, economy size, commercial and intellectual property policies, etc.) previously 
identified by the traditions of endogenous growth (Romer, 1990), competitive advantage 
(Porter, 1990) and national innovation systems (Nelson, 1993). They measure the 
national innovative capacity essentially by the number of patents per inhabitant granted in 
the USA, considered the best of the available indicators [Furman et al., (2002), p.909]. 
However, they also explore three others: scientific publications, the market share of  
high-tech industries, and Total Factor Productivity (Ibid., pp.912–913). 
It is obvious that there is no perfect indicator of innovative capacity. The one used by 
Furman et al. (2002), with all its limitations, has the advantage of being clear and of 
supporting international comparison better than others.1 An alternative proposal is to 
calculate an index composed of several indicators. This has the advantage of being a 
more complete measure and the disadvantage of being less clear. Archibugi and Coco 
(2005) offer a good explanation of the characteristics of these composite indices and an 
overview of studies based on them to measure technological capacity. 
The objective of this work is to provide a first approach – general and descriptive – to 
the evolution of Spanish innovative capacity from the mid-19th century to the present 
day. To assess the country’s performance in this regard, we will compare it with the other 
four major countries of Western Europe (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) on the one 
hand, and with two relevant Latin American countries (Argentina and Mexico) on the 
other. In terms of income, the European group belongs to the most developed world, the 
two Latin American nations, to the developing world, and Spain is in the middle. 
Therefore, the study will also shed some light on the relationship between innovative 
capacity and economic development. 
One of the main problems of long-term studies is the availability of data. In this work, 
the difficulty of measuring the innovative capacity itself is also added. In any case, we 
have been able to obtain three of the indicators used by the mentioned studies with the 
necessary temporal perspective. Fortunately, the best indicator of national innovative 
capacity according to Furman et al. (2002), patents granted in the USA, is available since 
the 19th century. The same goes for scientific publications, also used by those authors. 
Another indicator that can be considered as a reflection of the national innovative 
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capacity and which is also available since the 19th century is the number of resident 
patents applied for in each country. The latter has been used by Desai et al. (2002) to 
build its technology achievement index, which was included by the United Nations in the 
Human Development Report (UNDP, 2001). In summary, the data on the three indicators 
mentioned – patents granted in the USA, those of residents in each country, and the 
number of scientific publications – from the 19th century to the present day, all in per 
capita terms, are the basis of the present study. 
After this introduction, the following three sections analyse each of the three 
mentioned indicators respectively – first for the Spanish case, and then for the European 
and Latin American ones, and Section 5 concludes and provides some policy 
implications. 
2 Patents granted in the USA 
The first indicator that will be analysed is the number of patents granted by the 
mentioned countries in the USA per million inhabitants.2 The difficulty to obtain a patent 
in that country, greater for foreigners, discourages the application of patents based on not 
really new ideas or of low value. So there is some guarantee that the patents granted in 
the USA reflect a true innovative effort.3 In addition, given the size, the international 
weight, and the high technological level of the American economy, presumably the 
valuable and cutting-edge innovations from any place will tend to be patented there. 
These are some of the arguments in favour of using the patents registered in the USA to 
measure the countries’ innovative capacity.4 But this measure is not perfect, among other 
things because it is affected by the intensity of the bilateral trade and because it excludes 
non-patented innovations.5 Hence, it must not be forgotten that it is a limited indicator. 
According to the previous comments, Figure 1 would represent only an approximate 
view of the evolution of the Spanish innovative capacity from 1883 to 2009. Taking this 
into account, a first evidence shown by the data is that such capacity would have 
multiplied by a factor of 21 throughout those 126 years, as the country passed from 
obtaining 0.3 patents per million inhabitants on average in the three-year period  
1883–1885 to 6.5 in 2007–2009. Other evidence is that this improvement has not 
followed a linear trend but has taken place with noticeable ups and downs. In particular, 
the figure shows by and large three phases of expansion in the innovative capacity  
(1883–1930; 1943–1975; 1983–2000) and three of decline (1931–1942; 1976–1982; 
2001–2007). The latter three coincide respectively with the Great Depression and 
subsequent wars,6 the oil crisis, and the dot-com bubble. But if the expansionist phases 
are looked in detail, several shorter fluctuations are observable. For instance, the 
innovative capacity seemed to increase in the years between the 19th and 20th centuries 
and stagnate during the First World War, which coincides with previous findings on the 
Spanish economy (Maluquer-de-Motes, 1987). In the following phase, the innovative 
capacity increased in the 1940s and in the 1960s, whereas it was stagnated in the 1950s. 
The expansion observed in the 1940s differs from the usual view of that period (López 
and Valdaliso, 2001; Deu and Llonch, 2013), although it agrees with some recent 
contributions highlighting certain technological dynamism in those years (Camprubí, 
2014; Virós, 2013; Fernández Pérez et al., 2019). No doubt, the evidence provided is 
insufficient, but invites to look into the innovation activity in the ‘40s with more detail; 
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but also of the ‘50s, usually considered a dynamic period, contrary to what the patents 
granted in the USA apparently indicate. Lastly, the rapid and continuous expansion from 
1983 to 2000, with the only interruption of the early 1990s crisis, coincides with a period 
of considerable economic growth in Spain. To sum up, with its limitations, our first 
indicator suggests that the Spanish innovative capacity evolved in parallel – with the 
mentioned exceptions – with the country’s economic development. The other  
two indicators (the patents filed by residents, and the scientific publications) will qualify 
and complement this view. But before that, to evaluate the observed Spanish progress 
regarding the just analysed indicator, it is necessary to place it in the international 
context. 
Figure 1 Patents granted in the USA to residents in Spain per million inhabitants, 1883–2009 
 
Source: See text 
With the reservations mentioned above, Figure 2 would reflect the evolution of the 
innovative capacity of the five Western European countries represented there from 1883 
to 2009. According to this, it is obvious that Spain, in spite of its undeniable progress 
(Figure 1), has maintained throughout the whole period a very low level compared to that 
of the UK, Germany and France, and to the Italian one since 1950.7 The differences are 
overwhelming because, according to this indicator, Germany today would have an 
innovative capacity about 20 times higher than the Spanish one; the UK and France, 
approximately ten times larger; and Italy, about four times. With some fluctuations 
(without taking into account the anomalous years of the Second World War), the Spanish 
backwardness compared to the former three countries has maintained in similar levels 
since 1883 to this day. That is, Spain has been historically and still is today a very 
backward country in terms of innovative capacity. This has not prevented it to approach 
the income level of the most developed countries (Maddison, 2001), although it is 
probably the main reason why still it has not catch up with them; this not being possible 
unless the country improves its technological level. 
However, although Spain is clearly behind the leader countries in innovation, in the 
world context it occupies a relatively advanced position. Of course, there is no reason to 
be satisfied with this as the model of reference in this aspect must be the group at the 
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head; but it is neither reasonable to ignore it because it is one of the causes of the 
relatively high income level achieved by this Southern European nation. In this respect, 
the comparison with Argentina and Mexico – two Latin American countries with strong 
historical ties with Spain – can be illustrative. 
Figure 2 Patents granted in the USA to residents in five Western European countries per million 
inhabitants, 1883–2009 
 
Source: See text 
Figure 3 Patents granted in the USA to residents in Argentina, Mexico and Spain per million 
inhabitants, 1883–2009 
 
Source: See text 
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According to the number of patents per capita granted in the USA (Figure 3), Argentina, 
Mexico and Spain had a similar innovative capacity about 1883, but since then the two 
Latin American countries progressed more rapidly and surpassed Spain up to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. From then to 1960, Argentina was clearly ahead of Spain and 
Mexico. But from then onwards, Spain progressed rapidly, while the two  
Latin American countries fell apart. As a result, Spain has today an innovative capacity 
seven times as large as that of Argentina and Mexico. It is true that patents may not be a 
good indicator of the innovative capacity of developing countries, as several authors have 
pointed out [e.g., Bell and Figueiredo, (2012), pp.52–54; Kruss, 2018], but they tell us 
something about their ability to innovate in advanced technology, however small. 
Therefore, the evolution of this indicator over time can, at least, provide a certain idea of 
the trend of each country’s advanced innovative effort. So, according to Figure 3, 
Argentina and Mexico seem to be in a relatively worse situation today in this respect than 
in the first third of the 20th century, unlike Spain. This has probably something to do with 
the relative reversal of fortunes of these countries between the beginning and the end of 
the 20th century.8 The improvement of the innovative capacity in the long run requires 
consistent policies and investments as well as a propitious institutional environment, 
which Spain – with all its limitations – has been strengthening since mid-20th century. 
However, the other two nations seem to have spoiled from then onwards the innovative 
environment that apparently were developing at the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th. The explanation of this, which exceeds the object of the present 
paper, must be looked for in the complex economic and institutional history of those 
countries.9 
3 Patents filed by residents in their country 
As has been said, another plausible indicator of the national innovative capacity is the 
number of patents per capita filed by residents in each country.10 Those applied for by 
non-residents are not taken into account because, although they can be a way to transfer 
technology, they are the result of innovation activities accomplished outside the country. 
On the contrary, the patents registered in the country of residence usually result from 
indigenous innovative effort. It is certain that an invention could be developed in a 
country and patented in another, but this is not a real problem because the usual 
procedure is that inventors/firms patent their inventions firstly in their own country and 
later on – if it is economically worthwhile – in other ones. More problematic is when a 
resident patentee serves as a mere intermediary of a foreign inventor, because in that case 
the site of residence does not coincide with that of the origin of the technology. In fact, 
these cases are not rare.11 But standard patent statistics do not distinguish them, so we 
have to settle for the available data; namely, the patents filed by residents in each 
country. With its limitations, it can be taken as a rough measure of the domestic 
innovative capacity. Besides, compared to the previous indicator, this one has the 
advantage of including all patents generated by the national innovation system and not 
only part of them (those granted as well in the USA). A disadvantage is that it does not 
discriminate between more and less valuable patents contrary to the previous one. Hence, 
rather than alternative, the two indicators can be seen as complementary. 
 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    A comparative approach to national innovative capacity in the long-run 7    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
Figure 4 Domestic patent applications in Spain per million inhabitants, 1883–2015 
 
Source: See text 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the second indicator (the patents applied for in Spain by 
residents in the country per million inhabitants) from 1883 to 2015. The previous 
indicator (the patents granted to Spaniards in the USA) has been superimposed in the 
figure to facilitate comparisons between them. It is obvious, first of all, the great 
difference in order of magnitude between the two variables: approximately 100 to 1 until 
the 1960s and 20 to 1 thereafter. That is, up to 1960 Spaniards registered in the USA,  
in per capita terms, 1% of the patents they filed in Spain, and since that decade onwards, 
5% of them. This noticeable rise was due both to the great increase of patents granted to 
Spaniards in the USA since the 1960s and to the collapse of domestic applications in 
Spain since 1966. But in spite of their great divergence in quantity, the two indicators 
have evolved over time in a similar fashion. Indeed, by and large, both of them show an 
increasing trend up to the Great Depression,12 a resumption of growth in the early 1940s 
which lasts up to about the oil crisis, and a new recovery from the 1980s up to the 2008 
crisis. The considerable negative effect of the latter is only observable in the series of 
patents filed in Spain as for those years we do not have consistent data on the patents 
granted in the USA (vid. supra), although they probably have decreased. 
Together with the mentioned coincidences, Figure 4 shows as well some clear 
differences in the evolution of the two variables. One of them is that the patents filed in 
Spain recovered the 1930 level much earlier (c. 1945)13 than those granted in the USA  
(c. 1965). In addition, the applications in Spain showed a strong dynamism in the 1950s 
contrary to the stagnation observed for patents granted in the USA in that decade. 
However, the drop of the domestic applications in Spain that commenced in 1966 was 
previous and deeper than that observed in the patents granted in the USA since 1976. In 
both cases, the recovery began in 1983, but with different outcomes: while the patents 
granted in the USA increased rapidly to reach their highest level of all time at the 
beginning of the 21st century, the national applications in Spain have not recovered the 
maximum level reached in 1966. 
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The drastic drop in national patents from those years was not an exclusive 
phenomenon of Spain but international, which probably had to do mainly with a 
reduction in the propensity to patent. That is to say, this striking change would not have 
occurred so much because of a decrease in innovative capacity but because of a 
modification in the use of the patent system by the inventors due to several factors 
(Gilfillan, 1964). That turning point would have occurred in Spain in the mid-1960s, but 
in more developed countries it took place previously, as we will see below. A 
consequence of this is that the levels of this indicator before and after that change would 
not be comparable. This is one of the limitations of this variable as a measure of  
long-term inventive activity (Gilfillan, 1964; Sanders, 1962; Schmookler, 1966). Despite 
this, Schmookler (1962) has shown that fluctuations in the number of patents in the 
short/medium term are a good reflection of the evolution of inventive activity. In 
addition, this and another more critical author such as Sanders (1962) agree that the 
analysis of patent data is essential to understand many aspects of the innovative activity. 
Figure 5 Domestic patent applications in five European countries per million inhabitants,  
1883–2015 
 
Source: See text 
In short, the patents per capita filed in Spain by residents in the country indicate that the 
national innovative capacity grew since 1883 – with a strong setback in the 1930s – up to 
reach its historical maximum in the late 1960s. After another deep setback in the 1970s, 
in the early 1980s they resumed an increasing trend which lasted up to 2008. According 
to the value of the indicator itself, the Spanish innovative capacity in the latter year would 
be the same as in 1917, which is not credible given the enormous modernisation 
experienced by the Spanish economy throughout the last century  
(e.g., Carreras and Tafunell, 2004; Tortella and Núñez, 2011). This is indicative of the 
inter-temporal comparability problems of this indicator just mentioned. As the patents 
granted in the USA do not have this problem, they seem a more reliable measure of the 
innovative capacity in the very long run. Therefore, according to this, Spain would have 
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achieved its maximum innovative capacity at the beginning of the 21st century. In any 
case, the indicator of patents filed in the country by its residents – taking into account that 
it probably does not reflect the same thing before and after 1966 – allows to capture 
several nuances that the other one does not show, as we have seen. As in the previous 
case, the comparison with other countries, in addition of providing some new evidence, 
will allow to assess the real performance of the country regarding our second indicator. 
As with the previous indicator, the patents filed by residents in each country show a 
persistent backwardness of Spain compared to the largest nations in Western Europe in 
terms of innovative capacity from 1883 to 2015 (Figure 5). However, the order of 
magnitude of the disadvantage is much smaller according to this indicator than according 
to the patents granted in the USA (Figure 2). The German innovative capacity, which 
according to the latter has been normally 20 times as big as the Spanish one, in terms of 
patents filed in the country has been at the most (in the late 1920s and at the beginning of 
the 21st century) nine times as big. The UK has been between four and six times more 
innovative than Spain, and France, between 2 and 3. Italy has had a level only slightly 
over the Spanish one and in some moments similar or even lower. On average, the 1960s 
was the period when Spain was closer to the innovative level of those countries. 
In all five cases, this indicator has shown an increasing trend until reaching a 
maximum at some point in the 20th century, followed by a downward trend and a 
subsequent recovery, but only partial. As has been said, in the case of Spain that pivotal 
point was the year 1966, but in the other four cases it came earlier. The UK reached its 
maximum level in 1920, Germany in 1929, Italy in 1950, and France in 1951. The 
declining trend from those peaks reversed in the 1980s in all countries except in the UK, 
which is the only case where the level of 2015 was below the initial one (1883). The 
reversal was particularly strong in Germany and very weak in France. In any case, no 
country has recovered the maximum level achieved previously in the 20th century.14 
This pattern is also observable in the USA. According to Gilfillan (1964, p.44), the 
peak of domestic patent applications in that country would have been reached in 1929, 
although Stafford placed it earlier, in 1914. Gilfillan saw in this phenomenon a fall in the 
ratio of patents to invention and observed that it was something that occurred in every 
developed country (ibid.). In fact, the data just given seem to indicate a certain 
relationship between the moment of the turning point and the level of economic 
development; that is, the more developed the country was, the earlier the change seemed 
to begin. This needs more evidence to be confirmed but, in any case, it is also necessary 
to identify the specific causes of the decrease in the propensity to patent. Some authors 
have highlighted the following: the increasing transfer of inventive activity from 
individuals to companies, which would be less needed than the previous ones to patent 
their inventions; the increase in the weight of research conducted or promoted by public 
and military institutions, largely non-patented; certain unfavourable court decisions for 
patent holders; the decrease of patents of non-relevant inventions thanks to an 
improvement in the scrutiny by the Patent Office; the increase of license agreements and 
patent pools between companies, etc. [Gilfillan, (1964), pp.41–44; Schmookler, 1966]. 
This explanation makes sense, but it would be necessary to verify the effect of the factors 
mentioned in the use of the patent system by the inventors of the different countries. Of 
course, this would require an investigation in its own right, which exceeds the purpose of 
this article. It is pertinent, however, to close this section with the comparison of the 
Spanish case with the Argentine and the Mexican as has been done in the previous one. 
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Figure 6 Domestic patent applications in Argentina, Mexico and Spain per million inhabitants, 
1883–2015 
 
Source: See text 
The WIPO historical database contains information on the patents registered by residents 
in Argentina and Mexico only since the 1960s, although it also covers an earlier short 
period (1904–1910) for the case of Mexico.15 Having this limitation in mind, the first 
evidence stemming from Figure 6 is that Mexico apparently had an innovative capacity 
lower than the Spanish one both at the beginning of the 20th century and since the 1960s 
onwards, the disadvantage being greater and increasing in the second period. This 
contrasts with the advantage shown by Mexico over Spain before 1930 according to the 
patents granted in the USA (Figure 3). The geographical proximity could have influenced 
in this, but other factors must have affected because in that indicator Argentina was over 
Mexico since the 1920s and Spain has also been clearly ahead of the latter since the 
1960s in the two indicators.16 Argentina also fell behind Spain since 1960 with regard to 
patents granted in the USA (Figure 3), but had a similar level – and occasionally higher – 
from then to the early 1980s in terms of domestic patents filed in the country (Figure 6). 
However, while the declining trend in the latter indicator reversed in Spain in that decade, 
it was maintained in Argentina. So, today, the two Latin American countries have not 
only moved considerably away from the Spanish level, but have also fallen to their 
lowest level ever.17 These data reinforce the aforementioned idea (Figure 3) that in those 
countries an historical reversal in the innovative capacity has occurred compared to the 
first third of the 20th century, whereas Spain has maintained an increasing trend in the 
last three decades, although interrupted by the 2008 crisis. 
4 Scientific publications 
The number of scientific publications per inhabitant is strictly speaking a measure of the 
scientific capacity but, as many of the findings of those publications are the basis of 
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technological improvements with a commercial use, it is undeniable that such indicator is 
related to the innovative activity. This is why it has also been used as a measure of the 
national innovative capacity (Furman et al., 2002; Archibugi and Coco, 2005).18 It is 
certain that there are both scientific results with and without influence in the 
technological development, their relative proportion being unknown. Even so, it can be 
thought that scientific research – even that without practical application – helps to make a 
society more prone to innovation (Mokyr, 2002). This does not mean that every 
innovation comes from scientific activity [Mansfield, 1968; Geroski, (1994), p.23], so the 
number of publications would be in any case a partial and indirect indicator of the 
innovative capacity. Still, their analysis can give interesting clues, in addition of 
complementing patent data. 
Figure 7 Scientific publications in Spain per million inhabitants, 1860–2017 (logarithmic scale) 
 
Source: See text 
The Scopus database contains information on published works in many countries in all 
scientific areas since the 19th century to nowadays. There are other databases, but this is 
the broadest one, obviously without being complete. The data used in this study have 
been taken from it.19 As this is a first approach to the problem, we have opted for using 
the most general indicator (‘all documents’ in Scopus); that is, the number of publications 
in all scientific fields20 and document types (journals, books, chapters, working papers, 
etc.). Figure 7 shows the evolution of this indicator per million inhabitants for Spain since 
1860 to 2017. The quantitative leap from the mid-20th century onwards is so great,21 that 
the previous evolution can only be visualised if the data are taken in logarithms. This 
subtracts some realism (proportionality) from the graphic representation, but the main 
trends are clearly noticeable. 
It can be observed in the first place that from 1860 to 1935, with discontinuities and 
noticeable fluctuations due to the scarcity of data, there was a slow increasing trend of 
scientific publications in Spain. However, in that long period there were three declining 
phases: from 1870 to 1890; the first years of the 20th century; and the years around the 
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First World War. As with most indicators, the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) led to a 
drastic fall in scientific production, but in 1945 it resumed a growing trend that, with a 
slight and short fall in 1973, has lasted until today. In this second phase, the increase was 
particularly rapid in the 1940s and early 1970s. If the evolution of this indicator is 
compared with that of patents, there is great similarity for the period before the  
Civil War, both for patents granted in the USA (Figure 1) and for national applications in 
the country (Figure 4). Its evolution is also by and large similar to that of the two patent 
variables from 1936 to 1970, but since then, it is much more similar to that of the patents 
granted in the USA than of the applications in the country. Yet, it has also certain 
similarity with the latter since 1983. 
In general, the Spanish scientific production shows a clearly growing trend, and less 
fluctuating than the variables related with patents throughout the whole period, which is 
sign that it has been less affected than the latter by economic cycles. It seems, then, that 
the country has been able to develop a scientific structure that has gradually strengthened 
and increased its capacity without depending significantly on the economic ups and 
downs. Its lower sensitivity to these factors, circumstantial in many occasions, leads to 
think that the scientific production would provide a less distorted view than the other 
indicators on the evolution of the innovative capacity over time, in spite of being less 
adequate as a specific measure of the innovation activity. Like in the previous sections, 
the international comparisons will allow to assess the Spanish achievement in this regard. 
Figure 8 Scientific publications in five European countries per million inhabitants, 1860–2017 
(logarithmic scale) 
 
Source: See text 
The comparison with the main countries of Western Europe shows that the scientific 
backwardness of Spain was very considerable until the 1970s, when the recovery process 
– previously very slow – accelerated to the point that today it has almost reached the level 
of those other countries (Figure 8). Thus, the main difference between the Spanish 
position in scientific production and in generation of patents is that while in the latter the 
country has not been able to catch up with Europe, in the former it is about to achieve it.22 
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This different performance reveals that the two variables reflect different things. 
However, it also invites to think that the scientific capacity (publications) influences the 
innovative one (patents) with a time lag. In this way, for instance, the fact that Italy 
passed from having at the beginning an innovative capacity similar and even slightly 
lower than the Spanish one to be systematically over it since the end of the 19th century 
(Figures 2 and 5), could be explained by its clear superiority in scientific production since 
1860 (Figure 8). And the other way round, the fact that Spain has recently caught up with 
Italy in this aspect could explain why the distance between both countries is being 
reduced in terms of the generation of high-quality patents (Figure 2). Likewise, the 
greater advantage of the UK and Germany over Spain in scientific production fits well 
with their clear dominion in patents. However, the French case indicates that the 
innovative capacity (patents) would depend only partially on the scientific capacity as in 
this aspect that country has been normally (up to the 1970s) below Italy, whereas in 
patents per capita it has been always above it. Therefore, the innovative capacity would 
depend as well on other variables – like the level and/or type of education – and probably 
on the orientation – more or less practical – of the scientific system. Obviously, these are 
preliminary evidences which require a specific study. In any case, they seem plausible in 
addition of clarifying the logic behind the use of the scientific publications as indicator 
(indirect and partial) of the innovative capacity. 
Figure 9 Scientific publications in Argentina, Mexico and Spain per million inhabitants,  
1860–2017 (logarithmic scale) 
 
Source: See text 
Lastly, the evolution of the number of publications per million inhabitants in Spain, 
Argentina and Mexico is presented in Figure 9. It shows that, as happened with the 
generation of patents (Figures 3 and 6), Argentina had a systematic advantage over Spain 
in scientific production up to 1970, when the situation reversed. Although not so clearly, 
the relative position of Spain and Mexico in both indicators also evolved by and large in a 
similar fashion. As has been shown, in terms of patents granted in the USA (Figure 3), 
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Mexico was over Spain up to 1930 and also in the 1940s; in the 1950s both nations were 
at the same level; and since the 1960s, Spain took clearly the lead. This is also more or 
less the way in which the two countries evolved in terms of scientific production, 
although in this case Mexico’s advantage over Spain before 1930 was clearly lower than 
in terms of patents granted in the USA, which probably can be explained by geographical 
proximity, particularly favourable to Mexico in that variable. In fact, Spain was always 
over Mexico regarding domestic patents filed in each country (Figure 6). Despite this, the 
influence of scientific production on patents is still noticeable because the minimum 
distance between Mexico and Spain in that variable occurred in the early 20th century, 
precisely when Mexico was slightly above Spain in terms of scientific publications per 
capita. Anyway, the advantage of Spain in domestic patent applications indicates, as 
happened with France, that the relation between scientific and innovative capacity would 
not be proportional. It is certain that the very existence of such a relationship must be 
demonstrated, but the evidence provided is at least sign of it. The rapid progress of Spain 
(and the convergence between Mexico and Argentina) in both indicators since the 1970s 
is other evidence in the same line. 
5 Conclusions and policy implications 
Most would probably accept without statistical evidence that in modern times some 
countries have been more innovative than others. Indeed, according to the production of 
innovations with global economic impact, undoubtedly the UK, Germany, France, the 
USA, Switzerland and Japan would be among the most innovative nations. More difficult 
is to explain why this has been so. In almost tautological terms, one could say that the 
greater the innovative capacity of a country, the more innovative it will be. Therefore, if 
we were able to measure the innovative capacity, we would have taken a step forward to 
understand the problem. But that would not be enough, since even more important is to 
understand how the innovative capacity is created or improved; that is, to identify what 
factors determine it and in what way. More or less explicitly, these questions have 
concerned many researchers for a while. But the specific effort to measure the innovative 
capacity and identify its determining factors is more recent. 
In order to obtain a measure of the innovative capacity, some authors have used a 
single indicator and others have calculated a composite index. Whichever option is 
chosen, obtaining a measure of the innovative capacity is a necessary preliminary step to 
analyse its determinants. But, both quantifying the innovative capacity and identifying its 
determining factors are complex matters. In the present paper, an exploration into the 
former aspect has been carried out aiming to obtain a first general view on the evolution 
of the Spanish innovative capacity from the 19th century to this day. To that end, we have 
used three of the indicators used by previous studies; namely, the patents granted to 
Spaniards in the USA, the domestic patents filed in Spain, and the scientific publications 
produced in the country. A descriptive analysis of each indicator has been developed, 
highlighting at the same time the similarities and differences among them. In addition, a 
comparison with two groups of countries – from Western Europe and Latin America – 
has been carried out in order to assess the real significance of the Spanish performance. 
Although none of the three mentioned indicators is a perfect measure of the national 
innovative capacity, the study has provided some evidence – in line with previous 
research – that the number of patents per capita granted in the USA is probably the most 
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adequate one or, rather, the less inadequate. But we have also shown that the other two 
variables provide valuable information not contained in the former. Hence, a better idea 
of the national innovative capacity will be obtained if all the three indicators are taken 
into account. 
The first conclusion of the paper is that the Spanish innovative capacity has increased 
noticeably since the 19th century to nowadays. Such increase has been greater according 
to the patents granted in the USA and the scientific publications than to the domestic 
patent applications. The worse performance of the latter can be at least partially explained 
by the fall in the propensity to patent in the own country – an international phenomenon 
probably related to the economic development – after a pivotal moment in the 20th 
century (the mid-1960s in the Spanish case), thus making the values of this indicator not 
comparable before and after that change. Even so, the three indicators coincide by and 
large in their fluctuations over time. According to this, the Spanish innovative capacity 
experienced a growing trend up to 1930 and, after a period of decline, resumed the 
increasing trend in the 1940s up to the 2008 crisis, with only two short and slight 
downturns in the mid-1970s and in the early 1990s. Therefore, the innovative capacity 
evolved more or less in parallel to the economic development of the country. However, a 
careful look at the variables shows several short-term fluctuations over the years, the 
analysis of which must be addressed through more detailed studies. 
The international comparisons have revealed the persistent backwardness of Spain’s 
innovative capacity with respect to the main nations of Western Europe, but also a 
tendency to approach them, much more intense in terms of scientific publications than 
patents. On the other hand, Mexico was above Spain in terms of patents granted in the 
USA and scientific publications – not in domestic patents – up to 1930, and Argentina 
surpassed Spain in the three indicators up to 1960. But since then, both Argentina and 
Mexico began to fall behind, in such a way that nowadays Spain far exceeds the two 
Latin American nations in all the three measures. To sum up, Spain has been able to 
improve its innovative capacity over time and achieve a not bad position in the world 
context, but it is still far behind the most innovative nations. Therefore, the country needs 
to increase the effort made in recent decades if it wants to close that gap in the future; but 
also if it wants to maintain its international position, since there are several emerging 
countries that are already running faster. More worrying, however, seems the reversal 
experienced by Argentina and Mexico in their innovative capacity during the  
20th century. Understanding the causes of this is a matter of great interest, which would 
be the object of another study. 
These pages have presented a first general analysis of the long-term evolution of 
Spain’s innovative capacity compared to other countries. Valuable ideas have been 
obtained, but many of a preliminary nature, which point to interesting topics for further 
research. A pending task is to identify the factors that have determined the innovative 
capacity over time and the patterns of that relationship. The specific implications for 
policymaking must await that study. However, some tentative ones may be derived from 
the present work. 
By showing Spain’s persistent backwardness in terms of innovative capacity 
compared to the European leaders, the study can help Spanish policy makers become 
more aware of the need to put science and technology policies at the forefront of their 
interests. In particular, it can help them realise that doing so – as they have not done so 
far – is essential to reduce the very high unemployment rate that the country has dragged 
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on for decades. This would involve, among other things, creating adequate and more 
powerful institutional incentives to increase private investment in innovation. This is 
especially urgent at the moment, when estimates say that the coronavirus pandemic will 
drop Spanish GDP in 2020 between 8% and 13% and its unemployment rate increase to 
22%. The only way to reduce the impact of the crisis and achieve a rapid recovery is by 
promoting innovation to adapt the economy to the new situation that is emerging. 
However, the central government is rather thinking of introducing the universal basic 
income, which will make society more dependent on subsidies instead of being more 
innovative. The same mistake was made with the 2008 crisis, after which R&D spending 
decreased in Spain – unlike in most European countries – and the unemployment rate 
grew to 25%. In summary, this study can help policymakers learn from the past and 
understand that they need to increase, not weaken, the country’s innovative capacity by 
implementing smart policies that involve public and private actors.23 
In relation to Latin American countries, a first lesson for policymakers is that 
technological progress cannot be taken for granted: a reversal is possible as it has been in 
Argentina and Mexico since the 1960s. This is probably related to the institutional and 
financial instability that they went through in the last decades of the 20th century, with 
the consequent neglect of educational, scientific and technological policies. But the root 
of these problems lies in more fundamental causes, such as their high income inequality, 
their governments’ focus on control rather than growth, their low endowment of skills, 
and the weak link between their scientific/educational and business spheres  
[von Tunzelmann, (1995), p.360 ff.]. Therefore, to regain the path of increasing 
innovative capacity, these countries need, firstly, institutional stability and, secondly, to 
reinforce and reconfigure their national innovation system. Particularly important at this 
stage is the initiative of governments to facilitate links between knowledge institutions 
(universities and R&D centres) and companies due to the low innovative dynamism of 
the latter, as a study on Argentina recently pointed out (Pasciaroni et al., 2018). More 
generally, governments should focus on developing an institutional environment geared 
towards building national innovation capacities, such as China is doing successfully 
(Sawang et al., 2017). In fact, the East Asian modernisation experience can serve as 
inspiration for Latin American governments and entrepreneurs (e.g., Amsden, 1989;  
Bell and Figueiredo, 2012; von Tunzelmann, 1995). 
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Notes 
1 Although it can be less adequate for the analysis of the innovative capacity of developing 
countries given their lower technological level (e.g., Bell and Figueiredo, 2012). 
2 The data on patents granted in the USA to foreign residents have been obtained from  
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) (1977) for the period 1883 to 1976 and 
from the USPTO Database (https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/search-patents) 
from 1977 to this day. The data on the Spanish population have been obtained from Nicolau 
(2005) up to 2000 and from the INE (https://www.ine.es/) database from then onwards. 
Population data on the rest of the countries have been obtained from the Maddison Project 
Database (2018). 
3 This is less clear since 2009, reason why we do not go beyond that year in the analysis of this 
variable. For an explanation on the exponential (and spurious) rise of the patents granted in the 
USA in the last years, see, for instance, Cotropia et al. (2013). 
4 For a detailed explanation on this, see Furman et al. (2002, p.909) or Eaton and Kortum  
(1996, 1999). 
5 For a classic discussion on the limitations of patents as economic indicators, see Griliches 
(1990). For empirical evidence on the predominance of non-patented innovations, see Moser 
(2012) and Ortiz-Villajos (2017). 
6 The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and the Second World War (1939–1945). 
7 Actually, the disadvantage with Italy started in the 1890s, but it was not important before the 
Italian take-off after the Second World War. 
8 For an analysis of the Latin American ‘failure’ compared to the ‘East Asian miracle’ with a 
special focus on the technological aspect, see von Tunzelmann (1995), Chapter 11. 
9 For two overviews of the factors explaining the economic performance of Latin America in 
the 20th century, see Bulmer-Thomas (2003) and Hofman (2000). 
10 The data on domestic patent applications in Spain have been obtained from Sáiz (2005) and 
Ortiz-Villajos (1999) up to 2000 and from the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) Database (https://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/) since then onwards. Patent data on the 
other countries have been obtained from the WIPO database. For data on population,  
see footnote 2. 
11 As has been documented for 19th century Spain (Sáiz, 1999). 
12 The effect of the depression is perceived since 1931 in the patents granted in the USA, 
whereas the patents applied for in Spain were affected already in 1929. This time lag – which 
is observed along the whole graph – is due to the fact that patent applications in the USA take 
normally between two and three years to be granted. This is the reason why patent applications 
are more adequate than patents granted to analyse the relation between patent data and the 
economic situation. 
13 The anomalous peak at the beginning of the 1940s is explained by the accumulation of 
pending applications due to the administrative halt during the Civil War (1936–1939). 
14 For an analysis of the structural change in the level of patents worldwide since 1963,  
see German-Soto and Chapa Cantú (2018). 
15 More complete and detailed historical patent statistics of several Latin American countries are 
under construction (Beatty et al., 2017). 
16 Institutional inefficiency has been highlighted as a key determinant of the failure of the 
Mexican patent system from 1940 to 1970 (Campa, 2018a). The same pattern – dominion of 
foreign patents and a weak domestic innovative capacity – has persisted in the period  
1995–2015 (Campa, 2018b). 
17 Although it cannot be said with certainty due to the lack of data, from Figure 6 it follows that 
in the case of the two Latin American countries there was also, as in the advanced ones, a 
turning point in the propensity to patent at the end of the 1960s. However, the decline since 
then has been so pronounced that it seems to have been due not only to a change in the 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    A comparative approach to national innovative capacity in the long-run 21    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
propensity to patent but also to a loss of internal technological level. However, this is an 
interpretation that must be verified with more detailed research. 
18 More than 50 years ago, in his famous report, Gilfillan (1964) already considered that science 
was an input of inventive activity and used the number of scientific publications as an 
indicator of the growth of the American invention between 1880 and 1960. 
19 The data on the scientific publications of all countries included in the study have been 
obtained from the Scopus Database (https://www.scopus.com). For data on population,  
see footnote 2. 
20 By contrast, Nuvolari and Vasta (2015) use only data on publications in experimental 
sciences. 
21 It must be taken into account that the database is probably more incomplete in the earlier 
periods. 
22 It is true that the indicator used is crude, as it neither discriminates by scientific fields nor 
quality of the publications. In fact, when the variable is weighted by a quality measure (like 
the number of citations), the distance between Spain and the most developed countries is 
higher. Nevertheless, it is also diminishing [see Ortiz-Villajos, (2016), pp.234–241]. 
23 An example of this type of policy is the one implemented in Apulia, a disadvantaged area in 
Southern Italy, where a regional innovation system has been established in the mechatronics 
cluster at the joint initiative of the central government and local actors through the promotion 
of the interaction between companies and universities (Clò et al., 2018). 
